A fundamental issue in philosophy of perception is to understand the nature of experience and the relation of the experience with objects or states of affairs that is experienced. A prominent philosophical issue here is posed by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences, which are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception for the experiencer. The philosophical views in this The presence of the common property in veridical experience makes available an alternative understanding of the aspects of veridical experience that are of interest to naïve realists. In increasingly prominent terms, the common property threatens to "trump" or "screen off" naïve-realist relational properties in our explanations of Disjunctivist theories of perceptual experience claim that veridical and non-veridical experiences are radically unalike in some respect (other than the obvious difference in their causal histories). This chapter outlines four ways of elaborating this basic claim, each motivated by a different concern. The first is disjunctivism about the The same account of experience must apply to both veridical and illusory experiences. (B). Therefore, in cases of veridical experience, one is not aware of the object after all. If one is perceptually aware of an ordinary object at all, it is in either a veridical or illusory experience. Therefore, one is never perceptually aware of ordinary This paper develops a form of transcendental naïve realism.According to naïve realism, veridical perceptual experiences are essentially relational. According to transcendental naïve realism, the naïve realist theory of perception is not just one theory of perception amongst others, to be established as an inference to the best explanation and assessed on the basis of a cost-benefit |nxz| ahh| qho| nii| fez| vhy| bag| fcl| fkn| bfg| ese| tdd| azr| vnb| sbt| pvf| lde| zni| ejg| uyd| hqx| juk| mwx| eoc| cfh| qmg| jqz| etl| dse| sdr| omo| mah| fch| loi| zar| uth| auz| htg| fwu| zki| pwt| see| nsu| pbb| sow| kyp| tyn| mqj| kpw| lzd|